Which and Whose Shari\u27a?: Historical and Political Perspectives on Legal Articulation of Islam in Indonesia by Salim, A. (Arskal)
Indo-Islamika, Volume 2, Nomor 1, 2012/1433 | 31 
 
Which and Whose Shari’a?: 
Historical and Political Perspectives on Legal Articulation 
of Islam in Indonesia 
 
Arskal Salim 
Senior Research Lecturer, University Western Sydney (UWS), Australia 
arskal.salim@yahoo.com 
 
Abstrak 
Upaya penerapan syariah di Indonesia tidak lepas dari adanya pertentangan 
antara aspirasi politik dari para pendukung dan penentang dan dari adanya 
resistensi dari negara yang sekuler. Tensi ini telah melahirkan  perbedaan 
politik hukum yang sangat serius terkait penerapan hukum Islam secara formal 
di negara ini. Perdebatan atau perbedaan yang terus menerus tentang makna 
atau maksud dari kata syariah itu sendiri dan istilahnya menyebabkan 
munculnya perdebatan tentang syariah yang mana, penafsiran dan pandangan 
siapa tentang syariah yang akan diterapkan. 
Artikel ini menelisik akar dan sumber dari perdebatan dan perbedaan 
pandangan tentang politik hukum penerapan syariah. Artikel ini menganalisa 
faktor-faktor yang menyebabkan artikulasi dan ungkapan tentang penerapan 
syariah secara nyata berbeda. Artikel ini menegaskan bahwa perbedaan yang 
paling nyata dapat secara jelas terlihat dalam hal aspirasi masyarakat Muslim 
atas penerapan hukum Islam secara formal dan perlindungan hak-hak 
konstitutional kebebasan beragama. Menampilkan argumen bahwa meskipun 
penerapan syariah telah terlihat dalam beberapa bidang hukum yang diterapkan 
di Indonesia dan pemerintah telah mengupayakan syariah terkorporasi ke dalam 
sistem hukum baik secara nasional maupun lokal, pemerintah masih melakukan 
kontrol dan pembatasan dan syariah akhirnya masih saja secara ketat dibatasi 
pemberlakuannya. 
Abstract 
Attempts at the implementation of shari’a in Indonesia have always been 
marked by a tension between political aspirations of the proponents and the 
opponents of shari’a and by resistance from the secular state. The tension had 
led to the profound and ongoing legal political dissonance in the formal 
application of shari’a rules in the country. A continuum between conflicts in 
meanings and direct contradictions in terms has resulted in a debate of which 
and whose shari’a to be implemented.  
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This paper looks at the roots as well as the sources of those dissonances. It 
observes a number of conditions that make the articulation of religious law 
dissonant. It argues that more direct dissonance is discernible between the 
aspiration for the formal implementation of shari’a and constitutional rights of 
religious freedom. Arguing that despite shari’a has been able to seep into 
scattered legal aspects within Indonesian state and society and that the state 
has allowed shari’a to be incorporated in many ways into its legal system, 
nationally and regionally, it concludes that the state continues to control and 
restrict this dispersion and that shari’a remains tightly confined in Indonesia 
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Introduction 
One of my previous works focused on the interaction between shari’a and 
state laws of contemporary Indonesia.
1
 I argued therein that ‚attempts at the 
implementation of shari’a in Indonesia have always been marked by a tension 
between political aspirations of the proponents and the opponents of shari’a 
and by resistance from the secular state‛. My prognosis was that this tension 
had led to the profound and ongoing legal political dissonance
2
 in the formal 
application of shari’a rules in the country. It is discordant in the sense that it 
has been characterized by a continuum between conflicts in meanings and 
direct contradictions in terms. I have identified this conflicting articulation of 
Islamic law in Indonesia via three themes: (1) the ‘constitutionalization’ of 
shari’a; (2) the ‘nationalization’ of shari’a; and (3) the ‘localization’ of shari’a 
in Aceh. 
The first theme was about efforts to give shari’a a constitutional status. 
These efforts to constitutionalize shari’a in Indonesia appeared four times since 
the early days of independence. Firstly, some Muslim leaders (in June-August 
1945) struggled to introduce the well-known phrase contained in the ‚Jakarta 
Charter‛ (i.e. seven words: dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi 
pemeluknya – ‚with the obligation of carrying out Islamic shari’a for the 
Muslims‛) into the 1945 Constitution. Secondly, the same request arose during 
debates over the ideology of the state during the sessions of the Constituent 
Assembly in 1957-1959. Thirdly, a similar aspiration re-emerged in the MPRS 
                                                          
1Arskal Salim, Challenging the Secular State: The Islamization of Laws in Indonesia 
(Honolulu: Hawaii University Press, 2008). 
2 What I mean here by the term ‘dissonance’ is a spectrum between mild tension in meanings 
on the one hand and a direct contradiction in terms on the other hand. It becomes an umbrella term 
to cover a large range of meanings such as ‘inconsistency,’ ‘incongruity,’ ‘ambivalence,’ 
‘ambiguity,’ ‘conflict,’ ‘contradiction,’ ‘disagreement,’ ‘tension,’ and ‘inappropriateness.’  
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(Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara or Provisional People’s 
Consultative Assembly) sessions in 1966-1968. And lastly, it was demanded 
once again in the 2000-2002 Annual Sessions of MPR (People’s Consultative 
Assembly). All these attempts, however, ended in failure and shari’a remains 
lacking a constitutional status.  
The second theme demonstrated the extent to which the state has 
accommodated shari’a by incorporating its rules into the national law. Since 
1970s, the New Order regime started allowing, albeit limited, some principles 
of Islamic marriage law to be accommodated as national law. A step forward 
for national legal Islamization was the enactment of Law number 7/1989 on the 
Religious Court, which exclusively single out Muslim citizens. This Law 
opened the gate for further legislations not based on citizenship in general but 
on religious adherence in particular. The promulgation of three statutes 
exclusively for Muslims (Law no. 17/1999 on the Management of Hajj, Law no. 
38/1999 on the Management of Zakat (Islamic Alms) and Law no. 41/2004 on 
Wakaf or Endowment) was possible partly because a precedent already exerted. 
The third theme discussed how the state began granting degrees of 
autonomy to particular religious communities or regions to locally implement 
religious law in a limited territory. This legal Islamization through the 
enactment of Regional Regulations (known as Qanun in Aceh) becomes a new 
strategy of the proponents of shari’a in Indonesia, since the constitutional 
efforts have failed and that national legislation to apply shari’a has only 
achieved a limited success. 
Unlike my work above that explored legal and political dissonances that 
occur in the attempts at Islamization of Indonesian legal system, this paper 
would like to look at the roots as well as the sources of those incongruities. The 
dissonances can be traced back to the fact that the character of religious law in 
the history has changed over the centuries and that the notion of the modern 
state now is fundamentally different from the understanding of the role of the 
state at the time religious law initially developed in the pre-modern period. 
This particular issue was not dealt with properly in my work above. This paper 
therefore would like to present what are conditions that make the articulation 
of religious law inharmonious with the concept of nation-state. To this end, I 
will not only discuss legal articulation of Islam during constitutional debates in 
the history of modern Indonesia, but also examine various views presented 
concerning the question of which shari’a and whose shari’a is to be 
implemented in contemporary legal contexts of Indonesia.  
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Shari’a: which one you are talking about? 
In the view of Muhammad Sa’id al-Ashmawi, an Egyptian jurist scholar, 
there was a major shift in the meaning of shari’a in the history of Islam over 
the centuries. He stated that the original broad meaning of shari’a, which 
included principal values, codes, institutions, practices and legal rules, has been 
narrowed down and restricted to denote only fixed legal rules.
3
  
Ashmawi views evolution of the meaning of shari’a took place in four 
phases. First, the original meaning of shari’a in the Arabic language in the 
Qur’an, ‚refers not to legal rules but rather to the path of Islam consisting of 
three streams (1) worship, (2) ethical code, and (3) social intercourse‛. This 
proper meaning of shari’a was initially applied by the first generation of 
Muslims. Second, over time the meaning of shari’a extended to also refer to the 
legal rules found in the Qur’an. Third, after some time, despite the meaning of 
shari’a was seemingly expanded, it was actually narrowed down by 
incorporating more legal rules, both in the Qur’an and in the Prophetic 
traditions. Finally, the concept of shari’a came to include the whole body of 
legal rules developed in Islamic history, with all varying interpretations and 
opinions of the legal scholars. 
These four phases indicate that the way the term shari’a is applied today 
is not the way the word was used in the Qur’an, and no longer corresponds to 
its original meaning in the Arabic language.
4
 As a result, the concept of shari’a 
consisted of both its principal values and its legal subject matter, and it is, in 
fact, this latter portion which has become widespread through the Muslim 
countries. It is no wonder then that this understanding of shari’a as meaning 
‘legal rules’ has inevitably had an impact on the current growing political 
demand for the implementation of shari’a in many countries including 
Indonesia.  
The notion of shari’a in Indonesia is highly contested. The meaning of 
shari’a in the modern history of Indonesia stretches broadly depending on who 
interprets and observes it, how it is being stipulated, what kind of context it 
engages with, and when and where it is enforced. Despite there are two general 
concepts of shari’a, as principal values as well as legal rules, it appears that the 
definition of shari’a as legal subject-matter gains more support among the 
proponents of the formal application of shari’a in present-day Indonesia. 
                                                          
3Muhammad S. Ashmawi, Against Islamic Extremism, trans. and ed. C. Fluehr-Lobban 
(Florida: University Press of Florida, 1998). 
4Ashmawi, Against Islamic, 97-98. 
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 Despite it is not easy to identify exactly to what extent can a rule or law 
be included under the term shari’a, there are at least two ways for identifying 
or classifying a rule as part of it.  
Firstly, following Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1373), the determining 
factor that distinguish shari’a from others is the notion of justice contained 
therein. As Ibn Qayyim asserted, ‚Fa’in z}aharat ammara al-adl, wa asfara 
wajhuhu biayyi t}ari>qin ka>na, fa thamma sharulla>h wa di>nuh…Fa’ayyu t }ari>qin 
istakhraja biha> al-adl wa al-qist fahiya min al-di>n‛ [If the indications of justice 
or its expressions are evident through any means, then the shari’a of God 
(Islam) must be there…. Any means that can produce justice and fairness is 
certainly part of the religion].
5
  
The second criterion is legitimation, that is, by way of making a valid 
reference to the shari’a or at least taking inspiration from it. This means that a 
legal code is identified as shari’a via so-called ‘incorporation by valid 
reference’. The reason behind this is that everything in this world is not 
necessarily divine and hence to deny the existence of secular matters is 
impractical. Thus non-religious aspects might be religiously justified if there is 
legitimation or a valid reference is made to (the sources of) shari’a.6  
With these criteria in mind, one can argue that shari’a is not necessarily 
manifest in a textual legal form, but it is being found more in the substantive 
content of a legal rule. One example of this is derived from the secular 
stipulations in the Marriage Law of many Muslim countries. According to 
classical jurisprudence of Islamic marriage, a husband can divorce his wife 
wherever and whenever he wishes. But, the Indonesian Marriage Law 
stipulation, for an instance, states that a divorce in order to be valid and 
lawfully enforceable must be examined and executed only before the court.
7
 
Although this is not in line with the classical fiqh jurisprudence, this 
stipulation is religiously acceptable, as its objective is to prevent the overly 
frequent occurrences of divorce. In fact, this stipulation was closer to the 
implied meaning of the hadith: Abghad} ul-h}ala>li ila-lla>hi al-t}ala>q [of permitted 
matters the most loathsome before Allah is divorce].
8
 From this example, it can 
be argued that such a secular stipulation (that is, divorce is considered valid 
                                                          
5Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, al-T}uruq al-H}ukmiyyah fi al-Siya>sa al-Shar’iyyah aw al-Fira>sat al-
Mardiyyah fi Ah}ka>m al-Siya>sa al-Shar’iyyah  (Bayrut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 1995), 11. 
6See Knut S. Vikør, ‚The Shari’a and the Nation State: Who Can Codify the Divine Law?,‛ 
in The Middle East in A Globalized World,  ed. Bjørn Olav Utvik and Knut S. Vikør (Bergen: 
Nordic Society for Middle Eastern Studies, 2000),  232.  
7See Article 39 of the Law no. 1/1974 on Marriage. 
8See Muhammad ibn Yazid ibn Majah, S}ah}i>h} Sunan ibn Majah (al-Riyad: Maktabat al-
Ma’a>rif lil-Nas}r wa-al-Tawzi, 1417 [1997]), Chapter on Divorce, h}adith no. 2008. 
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only before the court) should be seen as shari’a, since it substantially refers to 
the source of shari’a, namely hadith. 
 
Shari’a: whose understanding to be accepted? 
There is no a comprehensive record as to the way shari’a was understood 
and practiced for the first time in earlier history of Indonesia. As the 
Islamization of Indonesia was an evolutionary process beginning from as early 
as the second half of the tenth century,
9
 the establishment of shari’a, in its 
variety of meanings and forms, took place gradually. It is probable that shari’a 
in Indonesia was initially present in Muslim practical lives. These include a 
number of social aspects and rituals from dietary meals to family matters.
10
 
Yet, it must be immediately noted that gambling, alcohol consumption and 
other pre-Islamic local practices remained noticeable.
11
  
The institutionalization of shari’a within legal and political structures of 
several Muslim kingdoms in different regions of Indonesia began only by the 
Seventeenth century. For an example, as noted by Reid, amputations as the 
punishment for thieves were enforced by the Aceh kingdom of the Seventeenth 
century.
12
 According to Peletz, although this kind of punishment was 
considered Islamic in nature, it was ‚not representative of Indonesia, Malaysia, 
or Southeast Asia as a whole before, during, or after that century‛.13  
Despite certain aspects of shari’a have been voluntarily practiced within 
Muslim communities of Indonesia, the enforcement of shari’a rules or the 
foundation of its legal institution always rely on the government efforts. The 
process of legal institutionalization was therefore dependent very much on the 
extent to which a ruler has a good understanding of shari’a. Sultan Agung (d. 
1645) of the Mataram sultanate, for instance, was considered more pious than 
his successor, Susuhunan Amangkurat (d. 1677). When the latter came to 
power replacing the former, he did the opposite to what had been established 
by his predecessor. Amangkurat restored the Pradata court, a Hindu Majapahit 
court that had existed in Java prior to the coming of Islam, and abolished the 
Surambi court, a court that was founded in accordance with Islamic tradition 
                                                          
9Azyumardi Azra, Islam in the Indonesian World: An Account of Institutional Formation 
(Bandung: Mizan, 2006), 1-25; cf. Merle Ricklefs, History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200 
(Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 2001). 
10Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450-1680. Vol. 1: The Lands 
Below the Winds (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Arskal Salim, ‚Perkembangan Awal 
Hukum Islam di Nusantara (Early Development of Islamic Law in the Archipelago),‛ Jurnal 
Respublica 5.2 (2005): 60-73. 
11Arskal Salim, ‚Perkembangan Awal‛, 63. 
12Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia, 143 
13Michael G. Peletz, Islamic Modern: Religious Courts and Cultural Politics in Malaysia 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 16-17. 
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by Sultan Agung.
14
 Likewise, the establishment of the religious court system in 
Java by the Dutch government for the first time in 1882 was very much due to 
colonial interests and their understanding of law in Islam rather than, for an 
instance, the piety of Indonesian Muslims. In spite of this, such legal initiative 
was seen as a foundational stone for the modern structure of Islamic court in 
Indonesia.
15
 
As pointed out by Judith Tucker, shari’a is not only a matter of legal 
doctrine. It is also a body of substantive law that took institutional form under 
a series of socio-political events throughout much of its history.
16
 Shari’a as 
articulated in Indonesia today can be seen as an upshot of a long struggle 
between different actors and agencies, including state functionaries, politicians, 
legal professionals and religious scholars.  
As early as the first half of the twentieth century, discussions on which 
shari’a and whose shari’a was to be enforced in Indonesia have emerged. The 
polemic between Natsir and Soekarno in early 1940s articulated the different 
views on this controversial topic. On the one hand, it was contended that 
shari’a in Indonesia would create a sense of discrimination, particularly among 
non-Muslims. Additionally, it was considered improper in a modern nation-
state to enact a national law by looking only at one source of religion to apply 
over various people with different backgrounds. On the other hand, it was 
argued that the implementation of shari’a in Indonesia would not spoil or 
endanger other religions or religious groups. In fact, a refusal to implement 
Islamic law in Indonesia based on the reason that it would hurt non-Muslims 
feelings, it was said, would tyrannize Indonesian Muslims whose population 
dominates the country, and would thus violate the rights and the interests of 
the majority.
17
 
When Indonesia’s independence was about to be proclaimed in 1945, 
contending parties agreed to make a compromise so as to allow shari’a to be 
inserted in the formulation of the Pancasila (as part of the preamble of the 1945 
Constitution). This compromise was well known later as the ‘Jakarta Charter’, 
which includes ‘the seven words’ dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam 
bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya [with the obligation to observe Islamic shari’a for 
the Muslims]. However, this compromise was vague since there was no clarity 
                                                          
14John Ball, Indonesian Legal History 1602-1848 (Sydney: Oughtershaw Press, 1982), 68. 
15Muhammad Hisyam, Caught Between Three Fires: The Javanese Pangulu under the Dutch 
Colonial Administration 1882-1942 (Jakarta: INIS, 2001); Mark Cammack, ‚Indonesia’s 1989 
Religious Judicature Act: Islamization of Indonesia or Indonesianization of Islam?‛ Indonesia 63 
(1997):143-168. 
16Judith Tucker, Women, Family and Gender in Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 15. 
17Arskal Salim, Challenging the Secular, 55. 
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about what the ‘seven words’ would actually mean in practice. The 
compromise was therefore interpreted differently according to the interests of 
the respective parties. For one group, the compromise meant that the 
government had to actively put shari’a into practice. For the other group, the 
practice of Islamic shari’a was a duty of Muslims, not the state. The 
implication of this formula and its precise interpretation in Indonesian legal 
realms has been controversial since then.  
For decades, the Jakarta Charter was not considered part of the 1945 
Constitution, regardless of how the Islamic parties viewed it. Despite there 
being a number of contending interpretations,
18
 the standpoint of the 
government that the Jakarta Charter was not part of the 1945 Constitution was 
widely accepted. Many of Muslim leaders have accepted the Presidential 
Decree issued by Soekarno on 5 July 1959 that acknowledged the position of 
the Jakarta Charter as being ‘inspirational’ and be ‘linked’ to the 1945 
Constitution. However, whether this should have given shari’a legal force and 
designated the state as being responsible for its implementation remains 
unclear. According Roeslan Abdul Gani, a former aide to Indonesia's first 
president Soekarno and a key player at the formulation of the Presidential 
Decree, the word ‘rangkaian’ (linked) should be inserted in the decree. This 
word, according to him, signified that the Jakarta Charter is not automatically 
integrated with the text of the Constitution.
19
 Given this, during the discussion 
of the amendment of Article 29 in the MPR Annual Sessions (2000, 2001 and 
2002), although Islamic parties took the view that the preamble to the 
Constitution was inspired by the Jakarta Charter, as the Presidential Decree of 
1959 put it, other parties did not share this opinion. In fact, these non-Islamic 
parties considered it a historical document that might function as a formula for 
political compromise, rather than as a formal accommodation of shari’a.  
Shari’a: which interpretation to be applied? 
In the eyes of Islamic parties, a constitutional status for Islamic shari’a is 
necessary, since only then could shari’a be officially implemented in Indonesia. 
However, Islamic parties were not able to agree on what kind of shari’a they 
would give a constitutional legitimacy.
20
 This appeared from the running 
                                                          
18See Endang Saefuddin Anshari, Piagam Jakarta 22 Juni 1945 (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 
1997), 129-143; Yusril Ihza Mahendra, ‚Dekrit Presiden 5 Juli 1959 dan Implikasinya terhadap 
Perumusan Politik Hukum Nasional‛, Dinamika Tata Negara Indonesia  (Jakarta: Gema Insani 
Press, 1996), 73-88. 
19See ‚Risalah Rapat Pleno ke-9 Panitia Ad Hoc I Badan Pekerja MPR‛, Buku Kedua Jilid I: 
Risalah Rapat Panitia Ad Hoc I Badan Pekerja MPR RI ke-1 s.d 10 Tanggal 11 Januari 2002 s.d 5 
Maret 2002 (Jakarta: Sekjen MPR RI, 2002), 639-640.  
20Cf. Tim Lindsey, ‚Indonesian Constitutional Reform: Muddling Towards Democracy‛, 
Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law 6 (2002): 270.  
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debate over all the meeting of MPR Annual Sessions in which the meaning of 
shari’a as interpreted by Islamic parties remained unclear. If one reads carefully 
through the proceedings of the meetings of Panitia (committee) Ad Hoc I in the 
2002 MPR Annual Sessions, it becomes evident that there was no clarity about 
what kind of Islamic shari’a it was that the Islamic parties actually proposed. It 
seems that all elements of Islamic shari’a would be included in their proposal. 
In that case, they wanted the constitution to formally declare that Muslim 
citizens are obliged to perform religious duties, without any precision as to 
what those duties might be.  
One explanation about what kind of shari’a would be officially 
implemented in Indonesia came from Lukman Hakim Saifuddin (PPP). He 
argued that his party views Islamic shari’a in three categories. The first is 
‘universal shari’a’, which comprises the principle values embraced by all 
religions, such as justice, equality and musyawarah (consultation). The second 
is ‘shari’a norms’, which includes all ideals of Islamic beliefs and practices that 
are applicable only to Muslims, and not to other believers. The last is ‘shari’a 
rules’, most of which are fiqh or legal interpretations of shari’a. Some Muslims 
might accept this last category, but most would reject it and argue over its 
content. According to Saifuddin, the PPP put high priority on the first two 
categories and struggles for their inclusion into the Indonesian legal system 
through legislative procedures. However, as for the third category, such as the 
obligation of wearing jilbab and severe punishments for criminals, the PPP was 
not, he said, in a position to struggle for it any further.
21
 
It was always very unlikely that a consensus over the meaning of shari’a 
could be reached among Islamic parties. While the PK(S) emphasized universal 
shari’a as the stepping stone for further introduction of the Islamic shari’a into 
public sphere,
22
 Hamdan Zoelva (F-PBB) contended that the whole of shari’a 
must be legalized. In his words, ‚a Muslim should carry out Islamic shari’a not 
only in term of rituals but also in all legal aspects including penal, civil, foods 
and trade. All these aspects of shari’a law require the support of the state if 
successful implementation is to be achieved.‛23  
It is interesting to note here that the F-PBB, as represented by Zoelva, 
was ironically leaning to ‘secularize’ Islamic law by acknowledging that the 
official implementation of shari’a in Indonesia ‚depends much on the outcome 
                                                          
21Interview with Lukman Hakim Saifuddin, a national legislator of the PPP, 13 February 
2004. 
22Nandang Burhanuddin, Penegakan Syariat Islam Menurut Partai Keadilan (Jakarta: Al 
Jannah, 2004), 119-127. 
23See ‚Pendapat Akhir Fraksi Partai Bulan Bintang Terhadap Rancangan Putusan MPR RI 
Hasil Sidang Tahunan MPR RI 2001‛ in Memperjuangkan Syariat Islam, 90-92. 
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of debates in the legislature‛.24 He added, ‚the final result of this debate would 
not be a Shafi’i Law, Hanafi Law or Hanbali Law, but a National Law 
produced by the Indonesian legislature.‛ For Zoelva, the final wording 
regarding the application of shari’a does not belong to a council of ulama like 
that of Iran. In fact, it is legislative members that hold decisive authority, while 
the ulama are just invited to present their opinions before a decision is made. 
Zoelva finally concluded that it does not matter that the legislated shari’a is 
actually a human product, so long as it is still based on God’s revelation.25  
Zoelva’s pragmatic stance raises the question of how shari’a can be 
referred to as God’s Law and its implementation strongly demanded, when the 
laws in question are basically products of human deliberation—that is, they are 
mostly products of legislatures. As Khaled Abou El Fadl has pointed out, ‚All 
laws articulated and applied in a state are thoroughly human and should be 
treated as such. These laws are a part of shari’a law only to the extent that any 
set of human legal opinions can be said to be a part of shari’a‛.26 Given this, it 
is no wonder that a huge number of Indonesian Muslims, at least as represented 
by the two biggest Islamic organization: Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, 
have very different visions of shari’a,27 opposed the proposal of the Islamic 
parties to amend Article 29 in the 2002 MPR Annual Session.
28
 
 
Conclusion 
Although Islamic parties and some state functionaries have been keen to 
formally facilitate the implementation of shari’a in Indonesia, this is frequently 
rejected by various groups criticizing what they mean by the term shari’a. What 
these people often want is to go back to the authentic application of shari’a; 
                                                          
24Interview with Hamdan Zoelva, 16 February 2004. Cf. Aharon Layish, ‚The Contribution 
of the Modernists to the Secularization of Islamic Law‛, Middle Eastern Studies 24 (1978): 263-
277. 
25Interview with Hamdan Zoelva, 16 February 2004. Other proponents of shari’a in 
Indonesia, such as Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, Front Pembela Islam, Hizbut Tahrir and Laskar 
Jihad, would vehemently disagree with Zoelva’s statement. For more information on the shari’a 
views of these Islamic groups, see, for instance, Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni (eds.), Gerakan Salafi 
Radikal di Indonesia (Jakarta: Raja Grafindo Persada, 2004); ‚Islam and Peace Building in 
Indonesia: The Analysis of Radical Movement and Their Implication for Security-Development 
Prospects‛ (Jakarta: ICIP-JICA, 2004); Khamami Zada, Islam Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas-Ormas 
Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002). 
26Khaled Abou El Fadl, Islam and the Challenge of Democracy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004) 36; Cf. my working definition of shari’a (Figure 2.1) in Chapter Two.  
27In a discussion held by the AsiaLink, the Univeristy of Melbourne, 15 February 2003, 
Hasyim Muzadi, chairman of NU, explained the stance of NU opposing the insertion of seven 
words into Article 29 of the Constitution. He said that NU does not expect shari’a to be codified as 
state law, but merely as communal directives for Muslims.  
28See ‚NU Tolak Piagam Jakarta‛, Suara Pembaruan, 12 September 2001; ‚Tiga Ormas 
Islam Tolak Piagam Jakarta‛, Media Indonesia, 30 May 2002; ‚Muhammadiyah Lega, Pasal 29 
Tetap‛, Media Indonesia, 12 August 2002.  
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although it is not clear what they mean by this. In fact, as Kozlowski points 
out, when religious actors or Muslim politicians call for the official 
implementation of shari’a in many majority-inhabited Muslim countries, they 
actually advocate a return to the period of colonial states, where shari’a had an 
organizational structure compatible with the modern nation state, and not to 
the time of the Prophet or the era of the caliphates.
29
 
Proposals of the Islamic parties to amend Article 29 of the 1945 
Constitution were inappropriate because they intended to restrict the list of 
specific liberties mentioned in Article 28 on Human Rights in the Constitution, 
which had been decided earlier. This incongruence stems from the fact that 
Islamic parties’ proposals gave emphasis to (religious) duties over rights, 
despite their proposals being expressed in terms of rights. If successful, the 
proposal for shari’a implementation would restrict religious freedom of 
individuals in the name of communal religious obligations. Certain citizens of 
the Indonesian state would be treated not as autonomous individual subjects but 
as members of a religious community-something that is fundamental 
contradiction with the concept of a nation-state. This would likely alienate and 
coerce citizens who do not subscribe to the official or dominant religious 
interpretation and would foster political divisiveness among citizens of 
different religious affiliations.
30
 Much clearer inconsistency is discernible 
between the aspiration for the formal implementation of shari’a and 
constitutional rights of religious freedom. As the constitutional principle of 
equal citizenship in Article 28I (2) mandates that all citizens have equal rights, 
regardless of their ethnicity, gender, or religion,
31
 lawmaking that is solely 
based on, and for the interest of, one particular religion may breach this 
provision of Constitution. 
Despite shari’a has been able to seep into scattered legal aspects within 
Indonesian state and society, it is nonetheless largely a state product rather than 
as a cultural process. The state not only allows shari’a to be incorporated in 
many ways into its structure, as well as into its legal system, nationally and 
                                                          
29See Gregory C. Kozlowski, ‚When the ‚Way‛ Becomes the ‚Law‛: Modern States and the 
Transformation of Halakhah and shari’a‛, Studies in Islamic and Judaic Traditions II, eds. William 
M. Brinner and Stephen D. Ricks, (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1989), 106; Cf. MB. Hooker, 
‚Introduction: Islamic Law in Southeast Asia‛, The Australian Journal of Asian Law 4 (3) (2002): 
217-218; Also cf. Ahmad Baso, Islam Pasca-kolonial: Perselingkuhan Agama, Kolonialisme dan 
Liberalisme (Bandung: Mizan, 2005).  
30Cf. Lucinda Peach, Legislating Morality: Pluralism and Religious Identity in Lawmaking 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 7. 
31Specifically, Article 28I (2) of the 1945 Constitution reads ‚Each person has the right to be 
free from discriminatory treatment in order to gain the same opportunities and benefits in the 
attainment of equality and justice.‛  
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regionally, but also skilfully controls and restricts this dispersion. In short, 
shari’a remains tightly confined in Indonesia. 
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